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ABSTRACT

Pakistan conducted six thermonuclear tests in response to five Indian nuclear
tests in 1998. There existed an interplay of various actors at the external and the
internal level which enabled Pakistan to reach the decision to detonate. This
thesis examines the motivations and intentions that acted as a driving force for
Pakistan to make the decision to go nuclear. In order to identify these intentions,
this thesis applies the national decision making model presented by Graham
Allison. The arguments presented will demonstrate whether Allison's model
explains the complexity of Pakistan's decision to go nuclear and which part of the
model best explains the motivations that led Pakistan to respond India in kind.
The conclusion of this thesis suggests that Allison's Rational Actor,
Organizational Process and the Bureaucratic Politics Models have some
usefulness in explaining Pakistan's decision to conduct nuclear tests in 1998. But
these models cannot be applied solely to explain the decision-making rather it
has to be a combination of all the three models to suggest what motivated
Pakistan to detonate.
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INTRODUCTION
The Indian nuclear tests in 1998 irreversibly changed South Asia. Pakistan
responded in kind on 28 May 1998. It is now a part of the world where nuclear
annihilation shall always be just around the corner. Generations in both Pakistan
and India will agonize over why and how it all happened. It was a move
calculated to demonstrate nuclear parity with India in which Pakistan carried out
five nuclear explosions.
The immediate international response to India's nuclear tests, led by the
United States, was to impose sweeping sanctions on India, and to warn Pakistan
that similar sanctions would be imposed if Pakistan decided to conduct its own
tests. But despite warnings of severe sanctions and aid cut off threats by the
International community, Pakistan decided to detonate its nuclear devices. At the
time of detonation Pakistan realized that the nuclear sanctions and the threat of
isolation from the international community would prove detrimental to her more
than it would affect India. Despite this knowledge that Pakistan is a weak
economic power and the threats to aid cut off would prove disastrous, these
conditions did not deter Pakistan to detonate. Decades of economic
mismanagement and mounting debt obligations had made the Pakistani state
heavily dependent on multilateral lending and grants to meet its budgetary
needs. The U.S. initiated multilateral sanctions and brought the Pakistani
economy to the brink of a collapse, threatening an internal and external default.
Pakistan's decision to detonate gives rise to various questions. Given
Pakistani knowledge of the economic and diplomatic pain it was willing to accept,
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it is important to understand why this decision to follow in India's nuclear
footsteps was taken. In order to answer this question this thesis intends to test
Graham Allison's models for national decision-making in the case of Pakistan's
nuclearization and determine what motivated Pakistan to go nuclear and how
they were able to do so.
Allison presented three models for national decision-making, which offers
a useful methodology to answer the question in focus. I will examine the three
components of Allison's model, which are the Rational Actor model,
Organizational Process and Bureaucratic Politics. The Rational Actor Model will
focus on the states self-interest at that time. The Organizational process model
will explain how Pakistan acquired the nuclear capability and managed to put the
nukes to testing.
The last part of this test will employ the bureaucratic politics model of
national decision-making. This section will examine the intentions of the
executive branch of policy making. It will also analyze the civil-military relations in
Pakistan at the time of nuclear detonation in 1998 so as to make clear as to how
much role did the military had to play in the decision making process. It is
important to analyze the role military plays in Pakistan because of its
overwhelming superiority over the civilian government and its subsequent
toppling of the democratic regime in 1999.
After the nuclear testing in South Asia by both India and Pakistan, the
concerns centered on the possible arms race in the region and efforts to curtail
nuclear proliferation. This thesis is an attempt to provide answers to the
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questions that were left unveiled in the wake of the nuclear crises as to what
motivated Pakistan to go nuclear beyond the desire to attain the nuclear
capability and curb Indian hegemonic designs ,which is the common view taken
by the Pakistani government.
This thesis is divided into four parts. The first part provides a literature
review and discusses in greater detail Graham Allison's national decision making
models and reviews what other authors have written about Allison's contribution
to foreign policy decision making. The second part examines the Rational Actor
Model

a~d

tests this model in case of Pakistan. The Third part deals in

Organizational process model to test the means available and the process
involved in going nuclear. Although organizational process entails the
technicalities of acquiring the nuclear capability it might serve to justify the
statements put forth by the Indian government that since Pakistan had the
nuclear capability, thus they had to put it to test.
The third part employs the bureaucratic politics model in much greater
depth, which includes analysis of the civil-military relationship in 1998. The
conclusion will serve to answer the main thesis question as to why did Pakistan
go nuclear, and address if Allison's models describe the Pakistani decision
making process in 1998 to detonate the nuclear devices.
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CHAPTER I
LITERATURE REVIEW

This thesis relies heavily on Graham Allison's model of national decision making
in his book Essence of Decision. 1 Allison has explained the Cuban missile crisis
through three different lenses; the Rational Actor Paradigm, Organizational
Behavior Paradigm and Governmental Politics Paradigm, each of which is based
on a different set of assumptions. His first model, the Rational Actor model
assumes that,
"The actor is a national government and that the action is chosen as a
calculated solution to a strategic problem". 2
The Rational Actor model is the model that is traditionally used by the students of
international relations. According to Allison the Rational Actor model is useful, but
to fully comprehend all of the decisions that go into a decision by a state one has
to look at both the Organizational Process model and the Bureaucratic model.
Rational Actor model conceives of governmental action as a "choice" made by a
unitary and rational nation or national government. This model treats national
government as an individual identifying problems and producing solutions and
alternatives. The virtue of the model comes from its power of explanation
especially in case it is able to expose the "purpose" of the nation/state. The
policies are made by the nation as a whole and are used for the maximization of
strategic goals. It emphasizes that each government is an individual actor with its
own goals, options and risk capability. Action is used as a response to problems

1 Allison,

Graham T. Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis Little Brown Company,

1971.
2 Ibid., 13
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facing the nation-state and the decisions are made by a cost-benefit form of
calculus and are used to maximize national interest.
According to Allison's second model, "Organizational Process":
"Governments define alternatives and estimate consequences as their
component organizations process information; governments act as these
organization enact routines. Governmental behavior can therefore be
understood, according to a second conceptual model, less deliberate choices
and more as output of large organizations functioning according to standard
pattern of behavior''. 3
In organizational behavior model, the analyst investigates e.g. the
standard operating procedures (SOP) of government organizations in order to
understand which policy alternatives are available to political actors and which
one is chosen and why. So, the organizational behavior paradigm closes the
gaps of the rational actor paradigm. Organizations look at the policy output and
are constrained by organizational routines. Thousands of government
organizations are involved in decision making process and the problems are
delegated to organizations and the power is diffused. Therefore where
organizations are concerned the Standard Operating Procedures dictate the
course of action.
Finally, for the "governmental politics model" Allison states that
"The decisions and actions of governments are international political
resultants: resultants in the sense that what happens is not chosen as a solution
to a problem but rather results from compromise, conflict and confusion and the
activity from which decisions emerge is best characterized as bargaining among
individual members of the government". 4
This model conceives of governmental policy under question not as a
rational actor choice or organizational output but as a "resultant" of bargaining
3
4

Ibid., 67
Ibid., 162
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along regular circuits among players positioned hierarchically within the
government. In this model, the political actors and their intentions, positions and
interests, their relative power, the action channels through which the political
actors input and exert their influence, decision rules and similar matters stand to
the fore in analysis. According to Allison the three models are complementary to
each other. Allison states,
"For explaining actions where national security interests dominate, shared
values lead to a consensus on what national security requires, Model 1 is useful.
For explaining specific characteristics of a governmental action performed by a
large organization, Model II is the most powerful. Decisions that emerge from
intra-governmental debate at the highest levels are the stuff of Model 111". 5
According to the bureaucratic politics model policy decisions are not made
by rational choice nor by a unitary actor, rather are policy decisions determined
by an activity of give and take between organizational units which can best be
described as a process of bargaining. Allison explains the bureaucratic politics
model as individuals in a group who are players bargaining for position and
power. As a result government interaction can be understood as a bargaining
game, with the outcomes resulting from competition. Bureaucratic politics sees
no unitary actors but many actors who focus not on a single issue but a variety of
issues. Therefore, rather than giving different answers to the same question,
each of the three models illuminates one corner of the issue and contributes to
our understanding. By integrating the factors identified under each lens, Allison
argues, explanations can be significantly strengthened. Many authors have
reviewed Allison's three models and for the purpose of my research I have

5

Ibid., 276.
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reviewed their literature in order to gain a greater understanding of the utility of
these models.
Bendor and Hammond have reviewed Allison's models and they provide a
thorough analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of each of his three models.
The rational actor, labeled Model I, is simple while, governmental politics, Model
Ill is extremely complex. Bendor and Hammond believe that a good model must
strike a balance between simplicity and complexity. They propose a typology of
policymaking that includes three primary dimensions: number of decision
makers, rationality of decision makers and availability of adequate information
(complete versus incomplete) for decision-making. Their matrix gives 12
separate policymaking types as compared to Allison's three models. 6 Overall,
they argue that in a bureaucratic politics model of decision-making, bargaining
occurs along regularized channels among a multiplicity of players positioned
hierarchically within the government, and these players bargain for a variety of
national, organizational and personal goals. Organizational decentralization,
slack, or discretion, permits players the freedom to negotiate, and it is this
political process of bargaining and compromise that produces policy outcomes.
In contrast, Stern and Verbeek regarded the old bureaucratic paradigm to
be partly rooted in "public choice". According to them, both of Allison's Model 1
(Rational Actor) and Model Ill (Bureaucratic Politics) can be construed as public
choice models. One interesting conclusion that has been drawn from this public
choice approach is that "the bargaining between such multiple rational actors

Bendor Jonathan and Hammond Thomas, "Rethinking Allison's Models", American Political Science
Review, Vol. 86, No. 2 (June 1992); 301-322.
6
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may produce an outcome that represents no actor's individual preference which
overall suggests that individuals bargain on behalf of, and in the interest of, their
organizations in order to mobilize their support. Bargainers are consequently less
concerned with the overall issue than the impact it has on their goals because
bargaining does not occur in an open space, but within specified and situationally
determined channels. Above all, personality and less tangible factors that
determine bargaining performance matter.7
The most widely criticized model remains model Ill of Bureaucratic
Politics. Art developed a criticism in his three propositions of "bureaucratic
politics" which state that the political stance is determined by organizational
position. A foreign policy decision once analyzed is the result of pulling and
hauling among political participants and is not intent of one person. He also
reasserts that implementation of any policy can be affected by organizational
routine, standard operating procedures and vested interests. 8
Art's criticism comes from the fact that Allison fails to give us any measure
to what extent "Governmental or Bureaucratic Politics" actually influence
Presidential choice. Art's first two propositions deal with policy formulation
however in his third he turns to policy implementation. Therefore, Art asserts that
"Bureaucratic politics" does not explain the formulation of policy.
Kozak and Keagle contend that the relationship between politics and
administration in the early twentieth century was depicted as policy-making being

7 Stern, Eric and Verbeek, Bertjan, "Towards a Neo-Pluralist Approach to Bureau-Governmental
Politics", Mershon International Studies Review, Vol. 42; Supplement 2 ( Nov.1998); pg:240-246
8 Art, Robert J., "Bureaucratic Politics and American Foreign Policy: A Critique", Policy Sciences, 4
(1973);467-490
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the realm of the elected officials. The mechanical execution of determined policy
was the realm of the professional public servant. Following World War II,
scholars began to develop skepticism about the politics/administration
relationship. Many scholars and administrators felt that the reality of public
administration was not well served by a model that separated politics from
administration. From that line of questioning a model was developed that
emphasized the political roles and relationships of bureaucracies, agencies and
departments and those who manage them. 9
The current day expert and student of the bureaucratic politics model,
Peters provides an interesting approach to the study of bureaucratic government.
Peters approached the study of bureaucratic politics by asking what is required
by a group of actors in politics to effectively govern a country. In his study, Peters
assesses each of the criteria separately to determine the role of bureaucracy in
governance. The conclusions that Peters draws from his study are applicable
here. Peters concludes that there is, to some degree, leadership in the policy
process being provided by the bureaucracy. In modern industrial societies,
governing parties do not possess the necessary skills for managing a nation. As
a result they must turn to and rely on the machinery of bureaucracy for the
missing or weak criteria. Increasingly the overload of government is being
passed on to become the overload of the bureaucracy. As an outcome
bureaucracies are faced with many of the same roadblocks in policy

Kozak, D and J. Keagle eds. Bureaucratic Politics and National Security: Theory and Practice; Boulder:
Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 1988.
9

9

development as government. Those include the need to answer to citizens,
clientele groups, and the survival of the organization. Thus bureaucracy, Peters
concludes, does supply some government, but unlike political parties, the
government provided by bureaucracies is non consensual and directed by the
bureaucracies' relationship with various clientele groups. The bureaucratic
politics model, whether one is inclined to see it in a positive or negative
perspective, has both good and bad attributes. 10
One interesting criticism of Bureaucratic Politics comes from Krasner. His
critique is stronger than other scholars because he maintains that Allison
inappropriately gives too much influence to actors other than the President
whereas in fact the President is far stronger than other foreign policy players. His
argument basically rests in the fact that the whole Bureaucratic Politics paradigm
shifts the blame from the leader or "the President" to the bureaucratic machinery
and relieves him of his responsibility. He has analyzed Allison's explanation of
the Cuban Missile Crises where Allison states that President Kennedy's decision
came as a result of different bureaucratic channels involved and that such a
choice would have remained a fore-gone conclusion regardless of whosoever
had been in place of Kennedy.
Krasner finds difficulty in accepting this and states that it is not fair to put
all the blame on the bureaucratic machinery relieving the Presidential office of his
responsibilities. According to Krasner the office of the President brings along with
it certain values and cultures which are a part and parcel of any decisions that

10

Peters, G. The Politics of Bureaucracy_3n1 ed. New York: Longman Inc., 1989.

10

are taken therefore, he refutes Allison's claim of Kennedy's decision during the
Cuban Missile Crises resulting from a push by the bureaucratic machinery. 11
In order to put Allison's Model Ill to test, Rhodes conducted a case study
of U.S Navy. The study focused primarily on the policy area including navy
budgets, procurement and force mix issues and tested the "pulling and hauling"
effect of bureaucratic politics as is widely believed to be the case by many
scholars. His intention was to test whether the outcomes of these policies were
influenced by the bureaucratic positions or were they simply natural outcomes as
they should have been in any policy issue. His conclusion was however contrary
to the literature available on Bureaucratic Politics and he stated that regardless of
the Bureaucratic Politics, the outcomes were not influenced by interests of
bureaucracy and was not also affected by bureaucratic power distribution. U.S
Navy made a very interesting case study because in determining how influential
bureaucratic politics was, Rhodes attempted to go into greater details of
budgeting, what kind of carriers Navy needed and allocation of resources for
performing effective functioning of the overall organization, these issues were
very important to be looked at to determine the outcomes. In his analysis of naval
ship building between 1950 and 1990, Rhodes found that the role of the navy's
"service unions" was insignificant in influencing the ship construction budget of
the United States Navy. According to him, there was no statistically significant
difference between the parochial loyalties of the navy's Chief of Naval Operations

11 Krasner Stephen, "Are Bureaucracies Important? (Or Allison Wonderland)", Foreign Policy, 7
(Summer 1972) 12.
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(CNO) between 1950 and 1990. Rhodes concluded that the importance that is
given to Bureaucratic Politics in shaping and influencing policies is not what
should be due. Instead he believes that different "ideas" could result in a policy
outcome and provide a better explanation than Bureaucratic Politics, which is
overly rated and generalized. 12
Valenta in his research has applied Allison's bureaucratic politics
paradigm to explain Soviet management of Czechoslovak crises of 1968. The
methodology of using the Bureaucratic Politics approach by Valenta reflects
"division of labor'' which the Soviet Politburo members share in various policy
areas. 13 According to Valenta this division of labor is a result of two conditions:
"(i) a highly bureaucratic political system and (ii) a collective leadership in
which no single decision maker possesses either sufficient power or sufficient
wisdom to decide all important policy matter''. (pg57)
It is important to understand the Politburo because the determinant of
Soviet foreign policy does not lie with a unitary actor instead it is a resultant of
political interaction (pulling and hauling) among senior decision makers. Valenta
believes that the images of national security are very strongly debated in the
inner circles of the Soviet decisions making machinery however the approach
taken in resolving issues might differ. In case of the Czechoslovak crises of
1968, the stand taken by senior Soviet decision makers differed in the time of the
crises for some believed that military solution to the crises was the best way to
end Czech reformism and the foreign policy decision makers believed an

Rhodes E., "Do Bureaucratic Politics Matter" World Politics 47, 1994;1-41
Valenta, Jiri, "The Bureaucratic Politics Paradigm and the Soviet Invasion of Czechoslovakia," Political
Science Quarterly, Vol. 94, 1(spring1979).
12
13

12

intervention to be too costly at that time. Valenta concludes that the decision to
intervene in Czechoslovakia and opting for the military outcome was based on
"bureaucratic interests and perspectives of senior decision makers,
manipulated information, East European political instability and pressures,
intergovernmental games in Czechoslovakia, signals of U.S noninvolvement and
shaky compromises among elements in politburo" (pg.75)
Finally his study shows that the Bureaucratic Politics Paradigm
substantially illuminates many aspects of decision making focusing on the
dynamics of the role played by the bureaucracies.
Many scholars have reviewed the Bureaucratic Politics Model from a
public policy perspective and it is important to look at that aspect as well. Kaarbo
is one such scholar who conducted a study, which is primarily an investigation of
the role of junior coalition partners in Israeli and German foreign policy. Through
an analysis of case studies, Kaarbo has assessed the characteristics of
parliamentary systems and politics of coalition and the role they play in foreign
policy. Through a case study approach she selected eight cases to investigate
the role of junior coalition partners in Israeli and German foreign policy. The
conclusions she came up with stated that intense coalition conflict existed over
important foreign policy issues between the competitive political parties sharing
government power and resources. Her research provides a challenge for foreign
policy analysts who claim that dominant actors always prevail. Because
according to Kaarbo, non-dominant actors (in her selected case studies) like the
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junior coalition partners in the cabinet, which are considered as "minorities in the
cabinet", have influenced foreign policy decision-making. 14
Another interesting study in the realm of public policy explaining the
structure of Bureaucratic Politics comes from Rourke. In Bureaucracy, Politics,
and Public Policy, Rourke provides scholars with a conceptual framework for
analyzing the bureaucratic policy process based on two independent variables,
expertise and constituency support, plus two intervening variables, leadership
and organizational vitality. Rourke contends that all organizations, even those
that perform simple routinized tasks, possess some degree of expertise and
political prowess. He further states that Bureaucratic expertise is manifest in two
important ways: firstly through the ability to collect and control information, and
secondly through the types of professionals that dominate an agency.
Political support, on the other hand, is most often derived from the clients
an agency serves or important legislative and executive constituencies (Chap.3).
While all agencies possess expertise and political support, organizational vitality
and leadership, the intervening variables differentiate powerful and weak
agencies. He also states that Agency success is also associated with strong
leaders who possess the ability to mobilize political support and to capitalize on
their agency's expertise (Chap. 4). I found that most interestingly, Rourke
explains bureaucratic behavior in terms of the quest for more money, more
people, more responsibility, and less accountability. These uses of the concept of
power lead to the conclusion that it is the end of bureaucratic behavior, that the

14 Kaarbo, Juliet (1996) "Power and Influence in Foreign Policy Decision Making: The Role of Junior
Coalition Partners in German and Israeli Foreign Policy", International Studies Quarterly, Vol.40:501-530
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more power an agency can acquire, the more operational and managerial
freedom it will have. 15
Brower and Abolafia in their ethnographic research study have used four
key elements from Allison's Model Ill to explain the view of bureaucratic politics
from those that are at the bottom of the hierarchical structure in bureaucracy.
These four elements are channels, positions, players, and preferences. In order
to complete the structure the activities of bureaucratic politics, they have added
Allison's "rules of the game" to their analysis. According to the authors, the
politics that takes place in the bureaucracy from middle to top is different from the
politics that goes on from middle to bottom. This makes bureaucratic politics a
"bargaining game". One interesting result of their study comes from the fact that
in lower levels of bureaucracy, the actors do not have the authority to influence
the policies therefore the elements of "individual identity, self-esteem, and career
become the stakes for political action".
The authors in their conclusion state that the actors that are at work from
below lack the position to influence policies, but this does not mean that they do
not engage in bureaucratic politics at all. They do and since they are unable to
use the regular available channels therefore, they use alternative channels to
participate in politics. I would agree with the authors that from the top, the main
goal is to bargain for a desired governmental outcome and from below it boils
down to selfhood and identity. Thus, when we talk about Bureaucratic Politics, it

15

Rourke, F. E. (1984). Bureaucracy, politics, and public policy (3rd ed.). Boston: Little, Brown and
Company

15

is important to analyze all those unseen factors that are involved in shaping the
outcomes of any policy. 16
From the Public Administration perspective, Paul 'T Hart and Uriel
Rosenthal in their research "Reappraising Bureaucratic Politics" have dealt with
three issues concerning the Bureaucratic Politics. Their research is very
interesting because after reviewing the three issues, they have left the grounds
open for International Relations scholars to import some of the conclusions and
utilize it in their researches. According to the authors, IR scholars have not
included in their research of Bureaucratic Politics any new dimensions than those
that were provided by Allison in 1971. The three issues deal with topics relating
with using the Bureaucratic Politics model as a "catch all" theory, four
perspectives about Bureaucratic Politics and lastly considering Bureaucratic
Politics to be a good or bad thing. Firstly, the authors find the whole bureaucratic
politics model to be "superfluous". They believe that Bureaucratic Politics model
fails to take into account the relationship politicians share with other stakeholders
in the policy networks. This model remains so much ingrained in the political
infighting that takes between the political bureaucrats that it loses its focus in
explaining the relationship between the politicians and bureaucratic advisors that
also includes military elites. 17
The authors also criticize the previous research that has been done for
better understanding of Bureaucratic Politics Model. The question that they have
16 Brower Ralph Sand Abolafia Mitchel Y, "Bureaucratic politics: the view from below", Journal of
Public Administration Research and Theory, Vol.7 No.2 (April 1997); 305
17 'T Hart Paul and Rosenthal Uriel, "Reappraising Bureaucratic Politics", Mershon International Studies
Review. Vol. 42; 2 ( Nov.1998); 233-240
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posed is as to why Bureaucratic Politics is taken as a dependent variable to
explain the policy outcomes? The authors contend that the bureaucratic division
of labor that exists between the executive branches is responsible for
bureaucratic politics and is a resultant of the rivalries between bureaus. 'T Hart
and Rosenthal have done a great deal of research providing a different
perspective to the entire debate that surrounds Bureaucratic politics both in
Public Administration circles and that too in the foreign policy analysis. They
have stated that the need is to look beyond the obvious bureaucratic politics set
up and come up with more explanations regarding inter and intra governmental
politics that forms a bigger part of the whole structure of Bureaucratic Politics.
After reviewing the existing literature I find it difficult to actually state
whether various authors have justified their criticism of Allison's models rightly or
not because each has done so trying to apply Allison in different situations.
Overall, I conclude that this past research and critique of Allison suggests that no
one model in its entirety can be used to explain national decision making. The
Rational Actor Model is as important as the Bureaucratic Politics Model and
where emphasis is given on different foreign policy participants the role a
President plays as a unitary actor can also not be ignored therefore these three
models together best explain any decision taken. From the formulation of a policy
till its implementation the standard operation procedures of an organization can
also not be disregarded because the organizational process forms the basis for
bureaucratic politics thus giving shape and outcome to the governmental
decisions. The usefulness of Allison's models depends on the situation or crises

17

one intends to explain. But overall there have been more criticisms of his models,
especially the bureaucratic politics model in providing a ground base for
explaining national decision making.
METHODOLOGY:

This thesis is based on a single case study and will test Graham Allison's three
models for national decision making. I will be testing all the three models
separately to find out as to which model (if any) best explains as to what were the
intentions of Pakistan when it went nuclear in 1998. The data that is available to
me for this thesis is basically drawn from journalistic records and I will be making
use of these records as the sole sources available to conduct this research.
I believe that testing the validity of the bureaucratic politics model (Model
Ill) presents some special problems, especially in a parliamentary system like
that of Pakistan (especially when we do a case study of Pakistani politics in
1998). Cabinet solidarity and secrecy will make it difficult for me to empirically
measure the level of debate and compromise that took place within the inner
circle of government. The condition of non-partisanship adhered to by
bureaucrats made any public record from a senior bureaucrat suspect to
questions of neutrality or ruling party doctrine. Finally, the debate that occurred at
the intra-departmental level occurred behind closed doors during the course of
the working day and was not susceptible to public debate and scrutiny. This
presents a methodological challenge to this study. However, with a
comprehensive review of journalistic materials available, many of the problems
will be overcome.
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CHAPTER II
MODEL I: RATIONAL ACTOR MODEL

I will provide additional elaboration of Allison's Rational Actor Model before
applying it in case of Pakistan. Following are the basic concepts that make up
RAM

"(i) Goals and Objectives
(ii) Alternatives
(iii) Consequences and
(iv) Choice". 18
According to Allison, in any foreign policy decision or national decision
making, an agent at the outset of his decision ranks all possible sets of
consequences according to his goals and objectives, and then he chooses from
a possible set of alternatives in the light of those objectives. Every alternative
bears different sets of consequences and different assumptions are derived from
each alternative. Lastly, Allison suggests that a "rational choice" is made by the
decision maker when he selects the best possible alternative as his course of
action which maximizes the gains of his decision and minimizes the costs.
The basic unit of analysis in Rational Actor paradigm is governmental
action as a "rational choice." Allison states that the rational actor selects the
action that will maximize strategic goals and objectives. Allison has based his
Model I on a number of assumptions in which action is a form of behavior that
reflects intention or purpose. The assumption is that actor is a national
government and the act chosen is a calculated solution to a strategic problem. All
these assumptions lead to a coherent set of details which explain as to what goal
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was perceived by the government when it acted and how that action was a
reasonable choice keeping in mind the nation's objectives.
He states that
"The rational action maintains that a rational choice consists of valuemaximizing adaptation within the context of a given payoff function, fixed
alternatives and consequences that are known." 19
According to Allison, the actor (government) is a rational, unitary decision
maker. The actor has one set of specified goals, one set of perceived options,
and a single estimate of the consequences that follow from each alternative.
Allison identifies the problem as action chosen in response to a specific problem.
The action is a steady state choice as perceived by Allison, among alternatives
rather than a large number of partial choices in a dynamic stream of events. The
Rational Actor model therefore has a unitary (or group) decision maker who is
able to state objectives, state preferences among objectives, generate alternative
courses of action, assess the consequences of every alternative action of each
objective and select the best alternative. Unlike the two other models (which are
merely descriptive) this model is normative, that is decision makers should make
decisions in accordance with these principles. 20 I will now apply this model to the
case of Pakistan's detonation in 1998.
In understanding how RAM can be applied to the case of Pakistan's
detonation, I will follow the four basic principles as proposed by Allison that lead
towards a rational choice.

19Ibid.,31

20
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(i) Goals and Objectives:
Like all strategic goals are achieved in the light of goals and objectives of
the decision maker therefore, the most primary objective for Pakistan after Indian
nuclear tests was to safeguard her national security. Pakistan's national security
was threatened when India conducted the tests in Pokhran, because it signaled a
dramatic shift in India's nuclear posture. India repeatedly emphasized that the
tests were not directed at any country but were meant to provide a credible
option to counter the geo-strategic threats in the region. The Indian foreign office
also released statements that sought to explain the Indian point of view to China
and to plead for friendly cooperation moreover these tests conducted by India
were said to be Peaceful Nuclear Explosion (PNE). 21 But given the hostility
between the two nations; Pakistan disregarded Indian statements of a peaceful
nuclear program and centered their arguments on a grand hegemonic design
that India had all along for South Asia which was realized by her nuclear testing.
Therefore, whatever decision Pakistan was to take was to revolve around her
strategic goals and objectives which ultimately go no further than India being a
threatening neighbor.

(ii) Alternatives
Analyzing the options available to Pakistan is the next step in applying the
Rational Actor Model. Pakistan had been under pressure from across the political
spectrum to explode a nuclear device of its own since India carried out its five
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tests on May 11 and May 13. Therefore there were only three options available to
Pakistan
(a) Do nothing
(b) Turn to international community and condemn the testing or
(c) Respond in kind to maintain the nuclear balance of power in the region
without which the most affected state would have been Pakistan.
Any wrong choice at that time would have resulted in a chaos and lifetime
regret, therefore it was ultimate for Pakistan's survival to make the right choice.
The choice of doing nothing bore consequences and so did the rest of the two
options available. But besides these three alternatives there was no fourth
means available of avoiding this whole ordeal when national security was
threatened. Especially when one considers the whole time frame which does not
span more than 20 days from the time India detonated and Pakistan responded,
it is interesting to note whether there could have been more options available or
not. As short as the time was for any of Pakistan's action to be credible, it leaves
little choice for analysis that the whole decision was based on very limited
options available to Pakistan.
(iii) Consequences

All the above mentioned three options bear different consequences with
merits and demerits. I will elaborate these options in greater detail, presenting a
cost-benefit analysis in each given case.
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I

-First Choice: Do Nothing:
The first option always in any given case is to do nothing, so this was true
for Pakistan as well. After India had carried out successful nuclear tests, the
choice left for Pakistan was simply to accept it and also accept the nuclear status
it brought to India. Like any other situation this option had its pros and cons as
well. Had Pakistan chosen this option, the world would have regarded Pakistan
as a stable nation who despite being grossly vulnerable to an Indian action like
detonation, kept its cool and refrained from following in India's footsteps. And as
two wrongs do not make one right, Pakistan's response would have made the
things worse. This option had two flaws.
Firstly, if Pakistan had decided on doing nothing, it would have reiterated
Indian suspicions that Pakistan is a weak state, fearful of Indian hegemony in
South Asia and that Pakistan does not bear a capability to respond which gives
India a free hand to do whatever she might please to disturb the strategic
balance of power in the region.
Secondly, if Pakistan had decided not to respond at that time then there
was nothing Pakistan could have done later to have countered the threats and
insecurity that would have become multifold after Indian nuclear tests and
Pakistan would have lost her credibility for good. The threat posed by the Indian
tests was very grave to national security of Pakistan. The Indians detonated five
nuclear bombs and these bombs developed, gave them the ability to develop
various kinds of weapons, ranging from a hydrogen bomb, which is a
thermonuclear or a fusion bomb, to a missile warhead, nuclear missile warhead,
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and artillery, nuclear artillery shells that can be used in a tactical situation. So this
is a wide range of weaponry that the Indians were moving to acquire and put in
their arsenal. 22 They already had tremendous conventional weapons superiority
over Pakistan. This was a blow to the stability in South Asia, and this was a fatal
blow to the international non-proliferation regime. So all these considered,
Pakistan was dealing with a country that in terms of nuclear proliferation was a
rogue state. Pakistan had to deal with India with strength. Therefore, it would
have been suicidal for Pakistan to do nothing. This option falls short for its merits
which only bring respect to Pakistan in the eyes of the world, but fail to provide
any security assurance in the wake of any future confrontation with nuclear India
after which Pakistan would only have the option to annihilate and perhaps not
even that. This led to consideration for the second option.
-Second Option: Turn to International Community:
Availing this option also had its merits and demerits. The International
community very strongly condemned India for conducting her nuclear tests and
at the same time urged Pakistan to refrain from testing her nuclear capability.
The Indian tests drew immediate condemnation from the Clinton administration,
who said the United States was "deeply disappointed" and was reviewing trade
and financial sanctions against India under American non-proliferation laws. The
other Western nations, including Britain, which voiced its "dismay"; Germany,
which called the tests "a slap in the face" for 149 countries that have signed the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty; and Kofi Annan, the U.N. Secretary-General,

22 Tellis Ashley J, India's Emerging Nuclear Posture: Between Recessed Deterrent and Ready Arsenal.
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who issued a statement expressing his "deep regret." All condemned India and
urged Pakistan to exercise self-restraint at all possible costs. 23 This stopped
Pakistan from appealing before the International community because regardless
of the condemnation of the tests by International community the situation could
not have been reversed. India's nuclear status was there to stay and be a source
of insecurity for Pakistan for all times to come and the international community
could not have provided Pakistan with any solace from the fact that the "power''
India attained with going nuclear was proving destabilizing for Pakistan. There
were no merits in sight in choosing this option because India had been defiant of
the United Nations resolutions in the past where the Kashmir dispute was
concerned and this for Pakistan was a very major blow. Thus, keeping the
inefficiency of UN in mind and its failure to curb the tensions between Pakistan
and India, Pakistan felt useless turning to International community for help.
Besides the United Nations, the United States had also deplored India's nuclear
testing and knew that a response in kind would blow the disarmament policies
the US maintains world wide. This was a very confusing time for Pakistan
because turning to the international community would mean that Pakistan was
open for any peaceful arrangements the community would have offered in lure
for Pakistan not testing her nukes. This would have bound Pakistan to go only
one way and would not have left any other possibilities open later on if the
situation for Pakistan was to become precarious. Had the international

Burns John F., "India Carries Out Nuclear Tests in Defiance of International Treaty," New York Times,
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community including the United Nations, been effective enough to urge India to
disarm, then this option would have hold its grounds, but at that time it did not
seem attractive enough to stop Pakistan from considering the third option.
-Third Option: Respond in Kind:

The third option available to Pakistan was to respond in kind to Indian
nuclear tests. Going nuclear and following Indian footsteps was however a much
more attractive way for Pakistan because this would deny India the unilateral
technical advantage it might have gained from conducting tests; secondly, this
option would have restored a sense of a balance-of-power with India in her own
eyes, India's, the rest of the world's and as stated earlier for maintaining her own
national security which was threatened in the wake of Indian tests. Finally it
would provide a chance for Pakistan to test her own nuclear capability and show
the world that through nuclear power it could match India.
The demerits of this option were however much more disastrous than the
merits. If Pakistan decided to go nuclear then it was to face International military,
nuclear and economic sanctions with immediate effect. These sanctions, if
imposed in the wake of any nuclear detonation, would potentially destroy
Pakistan's economy which was already in shambles and under billion dollar
debts owed to International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. Availing
this option also meant that no further loans were to be given to Pakistan to
continue with developmental projects and economic stability thus crippling the
economy once and for all. Pakistan knew fully well that the sanctions would hurt
Pakistan more than India. The international community already very strongly
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urged Pakistan not to detonate and had been reaffirming the after effects to
Pakistan since the time India detonated. Deputy Secretary of State Strobe
Talbott and General Anthony Zinni visited Pakistan after the Indian nuclear tests
and personally warned Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif about the consequences
that would follow if Pakistan considered responding in kind. The list of
possibilities offered to Pakistan was very attractive as it held the promise of
waiver from the Pressler Amendment, delivery of F-16's for which Pakistan had
already paid and a possibility of debt waivers. 24 But this would all remain a dream
and much more restrictions would be inflicted if Pakistan decides not to listen.
Considering the merits of not going nuclear and showing self-restraint as a
responsible country was much more lucrative with offers for economic prosperity
than going nuclear and losing it all. Not only losing it all, but also plunging into
deeper economic crises with increased debt burden. Therefore, the list of
demerits for this option was much more lethal in economic terms and less
attractive than the merit which only would have been coming at power with India
in nuclear capability and satisfying ego as far as matching head to head with
India was concerned. There also was a lot of internal pressure on Pakistan to
respond to Indian nuclear tests. These internal pressures were stronger than the
external ones and thus outbalanced all international restraint suggestions.

(iv) Choice
After weighing these three options it was amazing that the pressure for
testing still spanned the political spectrum from liberals like opposition leader
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Benazir Bhutto to the religious right. Bhutto reportedly went so far as to declare
that "if there is military capability to eliminate India's nuclear capacity, it should be
used." 25 Out of the three alternatives lined up, Pakistan chose the third option, to
detonate as a choice to deal with the crises. The most interesting fact remains
that this third option available to Pakistan was the one with the most detrimental
effects for Pakistan's future therefore it remains the most unpredictable choice
keeping in mind the aspect of rationality. According to the rational actor paradigm
following is the general principal of a "value-maximizing" behavior as stated by
Allison
"the likelihood of any particular action results from a combination of the
nation's (i) relevant values and objectives (ii) perceived alternative course of
action (iii) estimates of various sets of consequences and (iv) net valuation of
each set of consequences."26
All these four principles must be followed if a unitary decision maker has
to make a rational choice. A choice according to Allison would be rational only if
all the alternatives are perceived and options carefully weighed with carefully
analyzed consequences for each set of action opted. If this is applied in all
sincerity of the logic that surrounds this statement then it is very difficult to say
that Pakistan's choice was rational by any means.
Rational Actor Model and Pakistan's Detonation:
In applying Allison's Rational Actor Model, the cost benefit analysis would
become clearer if the Indian response to Pakistan weighing its options is also
taken into consideration. Since India has remained central to any decision
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making in Pakistan since its inception in 1947, therefore it is not wise to rule out
that Indian reaction was not considered while analyzing the choices and their
consequences. Although, there exists no official reference to support that
possible Indian reactions were analyzed in each case. Indian Reaction to
a) Do Nothing: If Pakistan decided to do nothing in the wake of Indian
testing; it would have strengthened Indian position where ultimate military
superiority in the region is concerned. It would have been in Indian
interests if Pakistan had chosen this option because in choosing to do
nothing, Pakistan was to lose its credibility that it possessed nuclear
capability and secondly, keeping in mind the animosity between these two
countries, India would also have had a psychological superiority over
Pakistan. Pakistan might have lived with Indian nuclear superiority, but I
believe the psychological victory would have been unbearable. This is also
suggested by the overwhelming public pressure the Pakistani government
was subjected to after the Indian tests. 27 Therefore, I believe that this
option was not the most suitable one for Pakistan because it clearly gave
India the winning edge which was unacceptable.
b) Turn to international community: Turning to the international community
would have provoked a severe Indian reaction because all along India had
been claiming that the United States possessed a "soft spot" for Pakistan.
India also had been blaming China for providing clandestine help to
Pakistan for nurturing its nuclear program. Choosing this option would
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l
definitely have provided Pakistan with economic benefits but an
unpredictable Indian reaction. Choosing this option would have created an
Indian uproar of "favoring" Pakistan which might have destabilized the
situation or help India in furthering its already aggressive stance towards
Pakistan.
c) Respond in kind: The last option of responding in kind had the proclivity
of propagating a negative Indian reaction as well. If Pakistan chose to
reply by her own nuclear testing then India would have taken a stance of
aggravating the arms race in the region. Secondly, in the wake of such an
action, India would consider building up her nuclear machinery which was
not so much a threat as was of her deploying those missiles facing
towards Pakistan. But the benefit of such an action would have given
Pakistan a minimal deterrence against any Indian aggressive posture.
All the three options with the exception of "doing nothing" possessed negative
connotations if considered from an Indian point of view. But "doing nothing" as a
reaction to Indian nuclear tests bore huge psychological costs for Pakistan which
outweighed the benefits (economic only).
Rapid Pakistani Response:
The time frame within which Pakistan responded to Indian attacks is not
more than 20 days. It is interesting to note that in those 20 days, all the options
were analyzed (perhaps), delivery vehicles were mobilized (definitely) and the
test site was prepared (absolutely). The question as to why Pakistan responded
so rapidly (with the third option of responding in kind) is a very significant one at
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this stage because it refutes the claim of the Rational Actor Model which states
that the action chosen is a rational action which maximizes the benefits and
reduces the costs for the actor. The reason Pakistan responded so quickly is
because that Pakistani intelligence sources suspected India for having planned
an attack on her nuclear installations. This intelligence report was the basis on
which the Indian High Commissioner (stationed in Pakistan) was summoned by
the Foreign Minister and was asked for an explanation at 1:00 a.m on May 27,
1998. These claims however were rejected by the Indian High Commissioner. 28
The next day, as the world witnessed, Pakistan detonated five nuclear devices.
This could only mean one of the two things. Either Pakistan was trying to have an
excuse in the name of "the so called intelligence reports" that helped expedite the
testing or Pakistan was building a face saving situation for the world to know that
due to heightened insecurity (and in the name of protecting her national interests)
the nuclear testing was inevitable.

Costs and benefits of pursuing a Nuclear Policy:
The political victory of BJP in March 1998 clearly signaled a nuclear
moratorium for pursuing of nuclear policy. A number of times during the political
campaigns and even after forming the government, BJP maintained that a
nuclear India was necessary to counter the threats posed by her aggressive
neighbors including Pakistan as well as China. 29 As mentioned several times by
the Pakistani officials, that the real threat for Pakistan emanated from Indian
hegemonic ambitions in the region and pushed Pakistan into pursuing a nuclear
28
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policy. 30 Therefore, regardless of provocation by the Indian tests of 1998,
Pakistan's nuclear tests were inevitable. Reason being India's possession of
nuclear capability as was demonstrated in 1974. Pakistan's testing of nuclear
bombs gave her military a gauging stability against the huge Indian conventional
capability. Although, Pakistan's testing provided Pakistan only with a minimal
deterrence but it did stabilize the balance of power in the region.
Nuclear detonation by Pakistan though shattered all economic stabilization
hopes but provided Pakistan with a strong military edge in comparison with India,
which Pakistan weighed as more important at that time than any economic
benefits in the wake of not testing and responding in kind. Therefore, pursuing a
nuclear policy definitely was in Pakistan's favor rather than pursuing her
economic agenda keeping in mind the delicacy of situation that existed between
India and Pakistan in 1998. Not responding in kind would have involved Pakistan
in an arms race, which would have borne huge economic costs in the long run.
Thus, I believe that Pakistan's option to go nuclear helped control the arms race
in the region which would have proven destabilizing in the absence of such a
response.
Following is the scenario when applied in case of Pakistan:
1. Basic Unit of Analysis: Governmental action as a choice: Pakistan
selected an action that maximized her strategic goals and objectives.

2. Organizing Concepts:
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(a) National Actor: Pakistani nation, Pakistani government conceived
as a rational unitary decision maker is the agent.

(b) The Problem: The threats that appeared after the Indian nuclear
testing drove the actor (Pakistan) to act in the manner it did.

(c) Static Selection: Among various alternatives available to Pakistan,
the action taken to detonate was conceived as the solution.

(d) Action as a rational choice: Now according to Allison there are four
components that constitute a rational choice:

(i)

Goals and Objectives: Pakistan decided to detonate keeping
in mind the national security and national interests as her
primary goal and objective.

(ii)

Options: After carefully weighing all the options available,
Pakistan chose the best suitable one.

(iii)

Consequences: Pakistan was very well aware of the
consequences that would follow if the decision to detonate
was taken and acted keeping in mind the costs and benefits
of those consequences.

(iv)

Choice: According to Allison, rational choice is valuemaximizing. Pakistan's decision to test its nuclear bombs
was the most suitable choice whose consequences ranked
highest in terms of her goals and objectives.
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3. Dominant Inference Pattern: If Pakistan chose to detonate then according
to inference pattern, it must have ends towards which this action must
have constituted a maximizing means.
4. General Propositions: According to Allison a rational action is the one
which is less consequential and possesses great value but in this case Allison's
predictions fall short.
Allison's RAM provides us with two propositions.
(i)

"An increase in the costs of an alternative reduces the likelihood
of that action being chosen.

(ii)

A decrease in the costs of an alternative increases the likelihood
of that action being chosen." 31

If we keep these two propositions in mind then applying RAM to the case
of Pakistan's detonation will have serious problems in explanation. The first
proposition suggests that in a cost benefit analysis, if the costs raise high for an
option then that action will not be chosen thus will not become a rational choice.
In case of Pakistan however, it was just the opposite. The option to respond in
kind had huge consequences for Pakistan and according to RAM it should not
have been chosen as an action rather an alternative would have been preferable.
But, Pakistan's decision to detonate and choosing this as the ultimate choice
defies Allison's first proposition.
Secondly, if we apply the second proposition then the choice for Pakistan
should have been either to do nothing or turn to the international community
because their merits put together provide a decrease in cost and either way
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would have proved to be less detrimental than the action actually chosen. If
Pakistan had chosen the first option of doing nothing as a response, it would
have gained her respect as a stable nation in the eyes of the International
community and gained her their support in the wake of any crises with India.
Similarly, turning to the International community would have helped in attaining
deterrence of some sort either in the form of International defense agreements to
strengthen Pakistan's conventional capabilities or the sanctions on India would
have provided some solace to Pakistan. But instead of all these merits that could
have decreased the "costs" of action Allison proposes, Pakistan decided to
choose an option which had the most severe consequences and the most
"costly" action ever for futures to come. Therefore, rational actor was Pakistan
but the action being the decision to detonate, was not rational which goes against
to the Rational Actor Model's principles.
Conclusion:
Going back to the basics of Rational Actor Model that dominate this
paradigm, Pakistan had an objective, Pakistan stated preferences among
objectives, Pakistan generated possible alternative courses of action, Pakistan
assessed the consequences of every alternative action of each objective and
Pakistan as a rational actor selected the best alternative (or was it the best?)
Now, if we analyze further whether the first two options of "doing nothing"
and "turning to International community" were really considered, then the time
span in which the decision was made and the third option "to respond in kind"
was finalized, leaves us in ambiguity. Despite the merits and demerits for the first
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two options, it is my assumption that they were not thoroughly analyzed by the
Pakistani officials. Reason being that any decision in history ever taken by
Pakistan at the national and international level has been India-centered. Pakistan
has felt insecure since the time of Independence in 1947 and therefore has
always paid heavy prices and high costs for her decisions to go to war with India
over a period of 55 years. After Indian detonation, this state of insecurity was
further heightened.
For the purpose of analysis, following are the statements that were given
by Pakistani officials between May 11th and May 31st which help explain the
mood since the time of Indian explosions till the time Pakistan detonated and
might help explain how difficult it was to select an alternative action which would
maximize the gains and minimize the costs.
Khan stated on May 11, 1998 following India's announcement that it had
conducted nuclear tests stated that
"Pakistan strongly condemns this Indian act and the entire world should
condemn it. It has sucked Pakistan into an arms race. 1132
The purpose of this statement was to let the International community know
indirectly that if Pakistan responds in kind then it would not be because Pakistan
wants so but because India has started an arms race in the region which is
unilateral in every aspect.
A statement issued by the Pakistani Defense Committee on May 13, 1998
stated that
"The Indian government had in recent weeks exhibited a pattern of
irresponsible behavior and taken deliberate steps to further heighten the tensions
in the region. 1133
Foreign Minister, Gohar Ayub Khan, The News International, May 12, 1998;pg.l
Report by Pakistan Defense Committee, The Daily Jang Newspaper, May 14, 1998;pg.1
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Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif on May 19, 1998 stated that
"I think we want to show to the world that Pakistan is a responsible country
... It can exercise restraint on itself. If India is doing this out of sheer madness ...
we don't want to blindly follow suit. "34
This above statement by Nawaz Sharif indicated his backing off from an
earlier statement stating that a nuclear test by Pakistan was imminent. Later on a
statement was given by Pakistani Foreign Secretary declaring that Pakistan had
conducted a sixth nuclear test on May 30, 1998
"Today we proved our credibility; there are no doubts anymore."35
The above mentioned statements by Pakistan's Prime Minister, Nawaz
Sharif and the Pakistani Foreign Ministry make a very good case to explain as to
how Pakistani officials kept oscillating back and forth on the issue of Indian
nuclear tests and Pakistan's unpredictable stand on the issue. After analyzing
these statements from both the sides it is obvious that it was a very confusing
situation for Pakistan especially when India had made it clear that her nuclear
program was not Pakistan centered. Pakistani statements reflect the state of
heightened insecurity at that time. At first Pakistan condemned and deplored
India for her nuclear tests and blamed India for dragging her into the nuclear
arms race. Later on the statements followed that Pakistan will avoid following the
route India had taken and will not respond in kind. Finally, the statement from
Pakistani Foreign Secretary Shamshad Ahmad on May 30 confirmed that

34 Report on televised address of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif on May 19, 1998, The Daily Jang
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35 Shamshad Ahmad, The News International, May 31, 1998;p.l (Foreign Ministry Press briefing after the
tests)
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Pakistan had conducted six successful nuclear tests and has matched Indian
nuclear capability.
The analysis of these statements by Pakistani officials suggests that only
one thing was guiding the light and that was to safeguard her "national security".
This national security card has been and is always played between India and
Pakistan and it was no different in 1998 as well. Thus, we can state that this
model does not provide us with sufficient explanation as to why Pakistan
exploded its nuclear devices in 1998 rather than opting for alternatives which
would have reduced the costs and benefited her in the long run. I say that
because firstly, Pakistan (as a rational actor) did not make an exhaustive search
for alternatives. One reference to support my claim comes from a statement
made by Deputy Chief of Mission; Embassy of Pakistan in the United States
stating that Pakistan was already under sanctions from the International
community and taking the nuclear route would not make any difference to the
economic situation in Pakistan. 36 This pre set mentality can also be seen in the
earlier quoted remarks from the Foreign Minister of Pakistan as well as from the
former Prime Minister Bhutto. Therefore, on the basis of analyzing this hawkish
behavior coming from those in position of authority to influence the governmental
decision suggests that may be the alternatives existed, the knowledge of their
consequences existed but their taking into account and completely analyzing
them was overshadowed by the preconceived frame of mind. Secondly, Pakistan
ignored information that was inconsistent with her pre-existing beliefs which
includes India's claim that India's nuclear program was and has never been
36
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Pakistan centered. Despite these statements, Pakistan due to the inherent
insecurity was bound to believe that India's detonations were the base of India's
grand hegemonic design. Third, Pakistan's preference order was not fixed across
time and space, meaning that the choice made to detonate was random and
momentous with no long term implications in mind and was made under sheer
internal pressures which include domestic egoist demands to come to par with
India.
Finally, even in we accept for a second that Pakistan made a rational
decision, it does not follow that group decision making proceeds in a rational
manner because in order to understand Pakistan's decision making the unitary
actor model does not suffice as there is an interplay of so many factors which
work in the background thus shaping the rationality or irrationality of her decision
which ones needs to understand before analyzing her as a unitary decision
maker. Decision-making in Pakistan does not follow a "unitary" decision-making
model. The General Head Quarter (GHQ) headed by the Chief of the Army Staff
(COAS), possess the authority to either approve or disapprove any decision
being made. All the political and foreign policy decisions have to be approved by
the COAS in order to be implemented. In sum, there are serious limitations to the
Rational Actor Model. After having said this, I would continue to test Allison's
Model II, the Organizational Process Model to find explanation to strengthen the
case for Pakistan's national decision making.
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CHAPTER Ill
MODEL II: ORGANIZATIONAL PROCESS MODEL

In order to apply the Organizational Process Model, it is important to have an
understanding of the process. Allison sees governmental behavior as to be
understood not as deliberate choices of individuals but rather as "outputs of large
organizations functioning according to standard patterns of behavior."37 Allison
draws upon the organizational theory to build a model of governmental behavior
based on multiple actors operating under constraints of bounded rationality and
curtailed information. According to Allison there are five characteristic deviations
from comprehensive rationality which are
"1) Factored problems (problems are factored into different parts which
are dealt with non- simultaneously)
2) Satisficing (decision makers satisfice rather than optimize
3) Search (organizations search using standard processes which limit
choices)
4) Uncertainty Avoidance (organizations deal with uncertainty by making
decisions, then making small corrections, like a thermostat, rather than
considering alternatives and making a single binding decision)
5) Repertoires (of programs are developed that limit effective choice)."38

Allison elaborates these five factors to strengthen his proposition of
organizational process paradigm. Complex problems are broken down into
pieces and then organizations factor them into parts which are to be dealt with
different organizations and not one as a whole. Contrary to Rational Actor Model
where the rational actor maximizes and optimizes his choice, in organizational
process that maximizing is replaced by satisficing which means that the option
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with the best possible consequence is chosen and all the rest of the options are
not so carefully weighed thus limiting the alternatives. Allison also provides four
concepts which link together goals, expectations and choice as follows
"1) Quasi-resolution of conflict (or how conflicting goals are managed by
achieving them sequentially)
2) Uncertainty avoidance (or how organizations focus on short-term
pressing problems and negotiate with the environment)
3) Problematic search (or how firms search for solutions to problems
based on simple minded rules)
4) Organizational learning (or how goals, attention rules, and search
procedures are altered)."39
Allison's second model II has many decision makers with the same goals,
but who are imperfectly rational and who have incomplete information; however,
sometimes, he seems to imply that some of the decision makers have different
goals. According to Allison, governments consist of large organizations among
which primary responsibility for particular areas is divided. As understood, the
actor is not a massive nation or government but rather an assemblage of "loosely
allied organizations on top of which government leaders sit"40 • Government
behavior relevant to any important problem reflects the independent output of
several organizations, partially coordinated by government leaders. Each
organization has a fixed set of standard operating procedures. The behavior of
these organizations and consequently that of the government in a particular
instance is thus determined primarily by routines established prior to that
instance. The leaders can exercise some choice in combining outputs, but the
mass of behavior is determined by previously established procedures.
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Allison states that the organizations have parochial priorities, perceptions and
interests due to several factors:
"1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

primary responsibility to a narrow set of problems
availability of selective information
tenure of individuals on the organization
small group pressures within the organization and
distribution of rewards by the organization"41

In summing up the organizational process model, the basic unit of analysis
is policy seen as organizational output and instead of one rational unitary actor,
the fundamental units are organizations. The actions taken by the organizations
are determined by routines, standard operating procedures (SOP's), repertoires
and the organizations react to standard threats using the standard options
available. The only way Allison's Organizational Process Model differs from the
Rational Actor Model is through its claim that SOP's guide decision making rather
than individuals finding alternatives to maximize their choices and making
rational decisions.
Organizational Process Model and Pakistan's detonation:

If we analyze Pakistan's decision to detonate in the light of Organizational
Process model then we need to investigate how the standard operating
procedures laid the ground work for Pakistan's detonation of nuclear weapons.
Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons Capability:

Pakistan's ability to deploy nuclear weapons had been clear since Nawaz
Sharif openly stated in August 1994, "I confirm that Pakistan possesses the
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atomic bomb." 42 Later on a more official statement came from Prime Minister
Benazir Bhutto stating in April 1995,
"We have enough knowledge and capability to make and assemble a
nuclear weapon. But we have voluntarily chosen not to either assemble a nuclear
weapon, to detonate a nuclear weapon or to export technology." 43
There is a history of continuing arms race between India and Pakistan, but
the real threat came from the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)
which during the election campaign in India made a statement to the effect that
BJP's "national agenda" would include adding nuclear weapons in India's
arsenal. 44 On April 02, 1998 after the statement by Bhartia Janta Party, Prime
Minister Nawaz Sharif sent a letter to heads of State/Government of USA, UK,
France, Russia, China, Japan, Italy, Belgium, Spain and Germany blaming India
for her nuclear ambitions which were destabilizing for South Asia. The Prime
Minister urged the international community to help curb the hostile Indian
tendencies and promote nuclear nonproliferation in the region. 45 Followed by this
statement; on April 06, 1998 Pakistan successfully conducted an intermediate
range missile test, Ghauri with a maximum range of 1,500 kilometers. 46 This
missile was a potential threat to Indian national security because it had a range
of 930 miles, capable of hitting major Indian cities. 47 This test was condemned by
the Indian government and sent out clear signals that now Pakistan possesses
Barber B., "Ex-Premier Declares Pakistan has A-Bomb", Washington Times, August 24, 1994.
"Clinton pledges to settle dispute with Pakistan", Xinhua, April 12, 1995, in FBIS-CHI, September 27,
1996.
44 Foreign Media Reaction, Daily Digest, United States Information Agency, Office of Research and Media
Reaction. April 10, 1998.
45 http://www.fas.org/news/pakistan/1998/04/980402-pak-let.htm
46 Akhtar Hassan, "Pakistan test-fires Ghauri missile," Dawn, 7 April 1998.
47 Quoted in Christopher Allan McHorney, "India and Pakistan: Newest Members of the Nuclear Club",
in Ralph Carter ed. (2002): CONTEMPORARY CASES IN U.S. FOREIGN POLICY (Washington, DC: CQ
Press)
42
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the capability to deliver her nuclear bombs through this missile. This missile test
by Pakistan was responded by nuclear explosions on May 11 and May 13 by
India which confirmed their statements about providing India with strong
defenses. After the Indian nuclear tests Pakistan's nuclear scientist Dr. Abdul
Qadeer Khan gave a statement on May 12 that
"Pakistan has nothing to worry about Indian nuclear tests and is very well
placed to meet threats to its security. We are ever ready and will do what the
Government decides." 48
This statement by Pakistani nuclear scientist clearly reflects the
confidence in Pakistan's nuclear weapons capability which was in a ready stage
of deployment within a short span of time and the time limit. Pakistan exploded
the nuclear devices between May 13 and May 28, which reiterates the claims
that Pakistan possessed the nuclear weapons system as well as the system
ready for early deployment. Looking at it from a sequential point of view based on
an organizational process model, it can be stated that the standard operating
procedures were put into place to test the nuclear capability and this came at a
time when Pakistan had already tested the long range missile which could carry
a nuclear warhead.
Another fact that further strengthens Pakistan's designs to keep her
nuclear machinery running and ready for use comes from a report published by
David Albright, which stated that since the 1980s Pakistan had been working on
a heavy water "research" reactor at Khushab. This reactor was alleged to be
"indigenous", but was developed with technical assistance from China which also
supplied the heavy water and was not subject to International Atomic Energy
48
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Agency (IAEA) inspections. Khushab had a capacity variously reported at
between 40 MWT to 50 MWT (but as high as 70 MWT). It was "commissioned" in
March 1996, but began operating only in April 1998.49 It is important to remember
here that April 1998 was also the same month when Pakistan tested the Ghauri
missile. Therefore, the debate about Pakistan's national security being
threatened by Indian nuclear tests of May 11 & 13 and her subsequent claims
about insecurities that arose as a result of Indian testing, has lesser weight
keeping in mind the calm expressed by Dr. Khan in his statement about
Pakistan's response. This scenario is only plausible when one analyzes it from
the organizational process model which emphasizes that the standard operating
procedures pave the way for decision making.

Pakistan's nuclear explosions: Detonation details:
Understanding Pakistan's nuclear capability is important to understand its
final decision to detonate. It is also important from an organizational perspective
because it requires organizational competency to undertake such a tremendous
task involving high levels of coordination. Pakistan had acquired the ability to test
a nuclear device as early as 1984. Following India's abortive bid in 1995 to test
its nuclear devices, Pakistan had prepared a nuclear test site in the Chagai
district of Southwestern Baluchistan, bordering Iran and Afghanistan. According
to Pakistani Prime Minister, Benazir Bhutto, Pakistan's "aim was to tell the

David Albright. 1998. ISIS Technical Assessment: Pakistan's Efforts to Obtain Unsafeguarded Plutonium
are Nearing Fruition, Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS), June 1, 1998.
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Indians that their move will be matched" and to send the West "a clear signal that
they had better done something to stop the lndians."50
In May 1998, all that Pakistani nuclear scientific state required was the
necessary political approval which was withheld until Pakistani decision makers
were sure that retaliatory tests would not incur unacceptable diplomatic and
economic costs. The order to conduct the tests was given on 18 May, 1998
because an exclusive Defense Committee of the Cabinet (DCC) meeting was
held on 16 or 17 May, 1998 and was attended only by the Prime Minister, the
Foreign Minister (Gohar Ayub Khan), the Finance Minister (Sartaj Aziz) and the
three Armed Services Chiefs. This meeting has never been officially
acknowledged but it must have been held as neither the Prime Minister nor the
Chief of the Army Staff alone could have made the decision to conduct the
nuclear tests. The DCC was the only competent authority to decide on this
matter, especially since the National Command Authority (NCA), Pakistan's
nuclear command and control authority for its strategic forces, did not exist at
that time. 51
From an organizational perspective, the decision remained as to which
agency was competent enough to carry out the task of conducting nuclear tests.
Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission was said to be the pioneer in setting up the
Chagai nuclear test site and was capable of conducting cold testing. Therefore,
on 18 May 1998, the Chairman of the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission
(PAEC) was summoned to the Prime Minister House where he was relayed the
Quoted in Zahid Hussain's, "Laying the Groundwork", News line, June 1998;pg.24
Muhammad Saleh Azam. 2000. When the Mountains Move - The Story of Chagai, Defence Journal,
June 2000
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decision of the DCC. "Dhamaka kar dein" (Conduct the explosion") were the
exact words used by the Prime Minister to inform him of the Government's
decision to conduct the nuclear tests. 52 The PAEC Chairman went back to his
office and gave orders to his staff to prepare for the tests. Simultaneously,
General Head Quarters (GHQ) and Air Headquarters issued orders to the
relevant quarters in 12 Corps, Quetta, the National Logistics Cell (NLC), the
Army Aviation Corps and No. 6 (Air Transport Support) Squadron respectively to
extend the necessary support to the PAEC in this regard. The Civil Aviation
Authority (CAA) also directed the national airline, Pakistan International Airline
(PIA), to make available a Boeing 737 passenger aircraft at short notice for the
ferrying of PAEC officials, scientists, engineers and technicians to Baluchistan. 53
After analyzing this account it becomes clear that from the time the order
to conduct the explosion was given on May 18 until the time it actually took place
on May 28, there was a gap of only 10 days. In these 10 days the test site was
prepared, weapons were delivered to the site and necessary preparations were
made to conduct the nuclear testing. This suggests that Pakistan had the ability
to deliver nuclear arsenals all along, had the place to conduct it on a short notice
and finally found the motive to accomplish what it had been trying to do in past
years. The Indian nuclear tests gave Pakistan just the right timing and excuse to
conduct her nuclear capability. Without this excuse Pakistan would never had
been able to declare herself a nuclear weapons state. Therefore, in response to
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Indian tests, Pakistan exploded five devices on May 28. A sixth device was
detonated on May 30 which was conducted some 100 kms southwest of
Baluchistan, according to seismic analysis. Like their Indian counterparts,
Pakistani officials seem to have exaggerated the numbers and size of the
explosions, announcing their first day's yield as 40-45 kilotons and a yield of 1518 kilotons for the test on May 30. Analysis of the seismic data does not support
these claims. The average magnitude reported was 4.9 on May 28th and a
magnitude of 4.3 on May 30. 54 According to Dr.Khan, Pakistan's explosion of
boosted fission devices used uranium 235 although it was capable of testing a
thermonuclear device as well. He further stated that the first enrichment was
done on April 4, 1978 and the plant was made operational in 1979 or so. By 1981
Pakistan was producing substantial quantities of uranium. 55 The enrichment of
Pakistan's own uranium production allowed Pakistan the confidence to go ahead
with any decision involving nuclear detonation without being hesitant of the
competency to carry it out.

Conclusion:
From Organizational Process Model's point of view, I believe that the
organizational options were narrowed down to whether Pakistan had the ability to
carry out a nuclear explosion or not. After the Prime Minister received an
assurance from the Chairman of Atomic Energy Commission that he could trust
the proficiency of the technicians involved and technology at hand, it was only a
matter of when and not if. If one wants to explain the specific characteristics of
54 Terry C. Wallace, "The May 1998 India and Pakistan Nuclear Tests," Seismological Research letters,
September 1998.
55 Qadeer Khan, The News International, May 30, 1998;pg.1
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governmental action then I believe that Model II is sufficient for that explanation.
As proposed by Allison, the existing organizational routine limits the options,
which is held true in this case because as analyzed earlier by Model I, Pakistan
had three options before making the decision to detonate i.e. to exercise
restraint, turn to international community for help or to respond in kind. These
options boiled down to simply a question of whether the capability to conduct the
tests existed or not. If yes, then how soon and if not, then what?
Organizations are fundamental units according to Model II; therefore in
this case, Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC), Kahuta Research
Laboratories (KRL), the General Head Quarters (GHQ), the Air Headquarters,
Civil Aviation Authority at the ground level, the Foreign Ministry and Pakistan's
Inter-Services Intelligence (ISi) at the policy level, were the main units that
played a crucial role in shaping the governmental decision. All of these
organizations in their unique capacity assured their support and reflected
positively on their capability to carryout the task at hand, which I believe made
the governmental choice much easier. Model II also emphasizes that
Organizations, by their nature, are parochial and tend to develop set propensities
regarding priorities, perceptions, and issues. 56 This also holds true at this level of
analysis because after India conducted its nuclear tests then it became a matter
of "ego" for the organizations in Pakistan which claimed over the years to have
possessed the nuclear capability and for them to give shape to their claim was
then or never. Their priorities were set by their abilities to match Indian claims at
the same echelon in an equal response. This over-confidence on part of these
56
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organizations failed to account for any economic turmoil that was in sight if
Pakistan had chosen the nuclear path and also ignored the possible economic
and political restraints promised by the international community in wake of any
nuclear explosions. The only concern of PAEC and KRL was to have a green
signal from the government to carry on with the testing.
The standard operating procedures were set in place and followed as the
government of Pakistan processed a go ahead signal to PAEC. If PAEC did not
have the capability to conduct nuclear testing then one could have stated that the
SOP's were not the guiding light for decision making that was made on May 28,
1998. But the evidence presented above suggests otherwise. The contribution of
organizational intelligence is also a strong point in assessing the credibility of
Model II. After the Indian tests, Pakistan was reportedly said to be receiving
information of a possible attack by India and this is also regarded to be one of the
reasons as to why Pakistan hurried into a decision to conduct her own nuclear
explosions.
The evidence of organizational intelligence comes from the summoning of
Indian high commissioner, Satish Chandra at 1:00 a.m EST on May 27 by
Pakistan's Foreign Secretary Ahmed and reiterated that Pakistan possessed
credible information of a planned Indian attack on Pakistan's nuclear
installations, which was refuted by the Indian high commissioner. 57 On the basis
of this one can state that Model II has some logical implications and keeping in
mind the influential nature of SOP's, it can be stated that organizations can guide
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the decision making process through following their set standard operating
procedures.
So far the explanation provided by Model II when applied in case of
Pakistan's detonation holds some logic but some aspects still remain ambiguous.
If one accepts the argument about Pakistan, testing its Ghauri missile in April
followed by inflammatory statements by Dr. Qadeer regarding its capability and
range as analyzed earlier then all seems to fall into sequence. Pakistan was to
test this missile in March but the testing was postponed. 58 The coming into power
of BJP government was considered as a threat to Pakistan's national security
because it maintained a very strong moratorium on including nukes to India's
arsenals for defense purposes without even conducting any tests. Pakistan used
the statement by a senior Indian policy official as a base for stating that Indian
nuclear ambitions should be curbed and that a nuclear India would be a threat to
the regional stability. 59 1believe that perhaps that was the time when Pakistan
started to plan for a response in case the BJP government kept its words and
carried on with the nuclear explosions. After BJP's coming into power, there was
created much hype about Nuclear India which was one of the strongest points
during BJP's election campaign bringing it home electoral victory. 60 This in itself
provides sufficient explanation for Pakistan if any such action took place in the
wake of the moment.
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The sequence in which the events line up from the time of BJP
government coming into power, Pakistan's postponement of testing its ballistic
missile and later on resuming the testing, India responding to the ballistic missile
threat by conducting nuclear weapons and Pakistan responding in kind, it seems
as if the organizational planning and implementation played a very important role.
A thorough analysis of Model 11 leads me to suggest that perhaps an earlier
planning process allowed the nuclear option to be exercised. The standard
operating procedures had to be set in place before a decision could be taken
which further strengthens the fact that a quicker response to Indian nuclear tests
was absent.
It would not be wise to rule out any possibility that Pakistan triggered this
whole arms race at that point in time when BJP was in power and Pakistan knew
that it was in a critical position to respond to any Pakistani aggression. Pakistan
also knew that nuclear policy was at the core of BJP government's policies and
there could have been no way they would have restrained from testing the
capability which would bring their government long-term stability. Considering
this scenario one can state that perhaps the standard operating procedures were
laid down to achieve that one objective for which Pakistan needed a viable
justification. One thing that relates to the ambiguity of the whole organizational
process approach is the internal politics of the organizations that were at play in
Pakistan in 1998. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif is on record to state (as analyzed
earlier in Chapter II) that Pakistan would refrain from testing. He issued this
statement in a televised nation-wide address soon after he condemned Indian

52

tests and maintained that Pakistan would not follow the same insanity which was
the driving force for India. Later on he issued a congratulatory statement that
Pakistan successfully conducted five nuclear tests in response to Indian
explosions and have settled the score. Model II fails to predict this behavior
because according to Allison as mentioned earlier, the leader of the government
sits on top of the loosely allied organizations. If we accept this to be true, then it
directs us to believe that there was much more internal politics amongst the
organizations at the ground level, which did not let the leader, have his way.
Given more time, Nawaz Sharif (who was reluctant to begin with) would have had
his resolve of choosing the non-nuclear option but before his words could be
carried out, the organizational machinery paved a way treading on which became
inevitable for him.
In order to understand the politics at play amongst the organizations,
which may or may not have been the cause of directing the decision-making,
Allison's Model Ill provides another explanation, which I will analyze in the
subsequent chapter. Therefore, as far as the Organizational Process Model's
explanation of standard operating procedures steering the decision making is
concerned, I believe that Model II does possess some relevance, but as far as
the intricate details of decision making is concerned regarding how much
influence was placed by the organizations to help close the deal, one will need to
find the answers through analyzing Allison's Model Ill, the Bureaucratic Politics
Model (without which the central question of the thesis will still remain
unanswered).
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CHAPTER IV
MODEL Ill: BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS MODEL
The last model to explain the national decision-making by Allison finds its basis in
bureaucratic politics. The governmental politics model conceives of governmental
policy-making not as a rational actor choice or organizational output but resultant
of bargaining along regular circuits among players positioned hierarchically within
the government. According to Allison, the government's decisions are resultants
because
"what happens is not chosen as a solution to a problem but rather results
from compromise, conflict and confusion of officials with diverse influence and
unequal influence."61
In this model, the political actors and their intentions, positions and
interests, their relative power, the action channels through which the political
actors input and exert their influence, decision rules and similar matters stand to
the fore in analysis. Allison has arranged the organizing concepts of this model
by explaining the players in position with their parochial priorities and
perceptions. He states that
"The governmental actor is neither a unitary actor nor a conglomerate of
organizations, but rather is a number of individual players." 62
These individuals are players in the game of national security policy and
their actions and preferences stem from the position they occupy. Allison
identifies these players as
"Chiefs (heads of different organizations), staffers (immediate staff of each
chief), Indians (permanent government officials in each organization) and ad hoc
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players (oress, interest groups spokespersons and public from concentric
circles)."l>3
One interesting detail that follows after identifying their positions is their
way of dealing with the issue in question considering their priorities and interests.
Allison states that
"answers to the question ''what is the issue?" are colored by the position
from which the question is considered."64
This explains as to why there never is unanimity in decisions because
every position held in the organization contributes to a different point of view,
unlike the assumptions of Allison's Model I according to which the action taken
by the unitary actor is intentional. Allison however, lays much emphasis on the
Indians (as specified earlier) who are responsible for framing, finding alternatives
and finally pushing the proposal to the Chiefs. According to Allison any issue in
policy making has three sides to it which can be defined in the context of Indians'
point of view:
"the issue looking down is options; the issue lookin~ sideways is
commitment and the issue looking upward is confidence." 5
The issue defined as options is considered to be a way of preserving the
Indians' own room for maneuver until things become clearer. Commitment is the
sideway issue which includes how others can be convinced to join Indians' own
beliefs. Finally the confidence Allison talks about is the issue of looking upward
entailing that the Indians give confidence to the chief to do what must be done.
Allison explains this point further by clarifying Neustadt's declaration that
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"the essence of any responsible official's task is to persuade other players
that his version of what needs to be done is what their own appraisal of their own
responsibilities requires them to do in their own interests."66
I believe this to be a very important point in explaining as to how the
Indians succeed in influencing the Chiefs and shaping their decisions by merely
giving them confidence in doing something that already is in accordance with
their duties and responsibilities. Thus, in order to sum up Model Ill, I will use the
aphorism used by Allison "where you stand depends on where you sit."67 In
contrast to the notion that there exists some single national interest, there is an
array of organizations and therefore there are bureaucratic interests overriding
the one national interest. Each bureau argues that its interests align with the
national interest, but in reality there are many separate interests. This politics is
what constitutes Allison's bureaucratic politics model, which provides explanation
for a national decision resulting as a competition between the interests pursued
by these different bureaus. According to conclusions drawn by Allison, Model II
illuminates the organizational routines that produce the information, alternatives
and action and it is within the context that Model Ill emerges. As Allison states:
"Model Ill focuses in greater detail on the individual leaders of a
government and politics among them that determine major governmental
choices." 68
Since, Model II and Model Ill draw great resemblances from each other
and Model Ill bases its further ground of explanation (of a governmental choice of
action) derived from the postulates of Model II; I would apply Model Ill as follows.
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Model 111 when applied will explain which players in what positions were centrally
involved and what were the existing channels of action available to them.

Bureaucratic Politics Model and Pakistan's detonation:
In order to apply Model Ill for explaining Pakistan's detonation in 1998, it is
important to recognize that the governmental action is a political resultant, which
according to this Model forms the basic unit of analysis. Therefore, to analyze
Model Ill and the organizing concepts as proposed by Allison, I will answer the
same set of questions as Allison asked, but in the context of Pakistan's decision
to go nuclear. Allison posed four interrelated questions:
"Who plays? What determines each player's stand? What determines
each player's relative influence? How does the game combine player's stand,
influence and moves to yield governmental decisions and actions?"69

Chiefs, staffers, Indians and ad hoc players
The dramas lengthy cast of characters were players in the national
security policy game by virtue of their position. They were the civilians in the
Parliamentary administration of Nawaz Sharif and the military players in the
General Head Quarters (GHQ). In order to identify the players whose interests
and actions effect the governmental decision, I will break them down into players
in position as explained earlier i.e. Chiefs, staffers, Indians and ad hoc players.
The Chiefs would include the president, prime minister, parliamentarians, foreign
minister, cabinet members, Chiefs of the Armed Forces, COAS as head of the
General Head Quarters (GHQ), Head of Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission
(PAEC), Head of Kahuta Research Laboratories (KRL), Chief of Civil Aviation
Authority (CIA), Governors and Chief of Inter Services Intelligence (ISi).
69
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The Indian nuclear tests created a situation in which the Pakistani
leadership saw both an even greater need to test and a possible opening to
justify the test as a response that was both politically and strategically
understandable. By 1998, the Pakistani military had grown very sensitive to the
decline of its conventional military capabilities after US cooperation was stopped
by the Pressler Amendment in 1990. Between 1990 and 1996, Pakistan became
dependent on Chinese arms when some US military equipment that had been
paid for in 1980s was released under "one-time waiver''. Every major arms
supplier was involved in cooperation with India at that time. 70 Pakistan's loss of
its arms supplier (US) to India, led to a feeling of abandonment and resentment.
Chair of national Assembly's Standing Committee for Defense Affairs stated that
"The order in conventional arms has now been disturbed to a great extent."71 The
feeling of abandonment reinvigorated the military's interest in nuclear deterrence
of conventional war.
On the political front, despite pressures from the military and the
opportunity opened by the Indian tests, Nawaz was apparently reluctant to
authorize them. On May 19, 1998 a week after the Indian tests he stated that
"Why we are not testing is because of the fact that I want to show the
world that Pakistan is a responsible country. If India is doing it out of sheer
madness, we do not have to blindly follow the suit."72
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Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif was hesitant to test and was genuinely
concerned about the impact economic sanctions will have on Pakistan in the
wake of any nuclear tests. Within his cabinet, differences of opinion existed.
Some factions supported and some opposed nuclear testing, thus attempted to
influence the public opinion through broadcast and print media. 73 But those
officials who opposed did not carry much weight as far as their position of
influencing the decision making was concerned. But on the other hand, Pakistan
military's thinking was influenced by factors such as prestige as well as
perceptions of an Indian threat. Senior military personnel believed that, "We will
never be able to remove the nuclear imbalance if we do not follow suit with our
own explosion."74 Therefore, the internal balance tilted towards a retaliatory
response resulting in May 1998 Pakistani nuclear detonation. In the perceptions
of Pakistan's authoritative decision makers, US military and economic incentives
did not measure favorably against issues of prestige and credibility.
Under pressure from the military, Nawaz Sharif warned President Clinton
that the decision "was out of my hands", implying that the military high command
was ultimately responsible for Pakistan's nuclear response. 75 Pakistan's Inter
Services Intelligence (ISi) also remained a very active player and helped shaped
the decision making especially where the nuclear explosions of 1998 were
concerned. Pakistani intelligence gathered some sources stating that two
American fighter jets were spotted at a Forward Operating Indian airbase on May
73 Quoted in Zahid Hussain, "The Bomb and After", Newsline (June 1998), pg: 22-23. A pro-test official
argued that Pakistan had "no other choice but to go for our own test", while another official opposing the
testing argued that "a nuclear test would be a disaster for Pakistan".
74 Quoted in Zahid Hassan, "Laying the Groundwork", Newsline (June 1998), p.24
75 Quoted in Michael Hirsh and John Barry, "Nuclear Jitters", Newsweek, June 08, 1998, p.16
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27. It was stated that they were there to take out Pakistan's nuclear installation
backed by an Indian plan to sever the Pakistani response to its nuclear
explosions of May 11 and 13, 1998.76 Therefore, on the basis of this intelligence
reported, though later on denied by Indian officials, led Pakistani government to
finalize the decision either for or against the nuclear detonation. The results of
the Defense Committee of the Cabinet (DCC) as discussed in analysis of Model
II in previous chapter as well, indicated that it was only the Minister of Finance &
Economic Affairs, Sartaj Aziz who opposed the tests keeping in mind the
repercussions that Pakistan would have to face in the wake of imposition of
heavy economic sanctions. 77
The meeting was attended by all the Chiefs as Allison has termed, which
included the Prime Minister of Pakistan, the Minister of Defense, the Minister of
Foreign Affairs, Gohar Ayub Khan, the Minister of Finance & Economic Affairs,
Sartaj Aziz, the Foreign Secretary, Shamshad Ahmed Khan and the three Chiefs
of Staff of the Army, Air Force and Navy, namely General Jehangir Karamat, Air
Chief Marshal Pervaiz Mehdi Qureshi and Admiral Fasih Bokhari respectively. 78
All of them favored Pakistan carrying on with the nuclear explosions with the
exception of Aziz.
Allison defines staffers as the immediate staff of each Chief and Indians
as the permanent political appointees which would be the civil service machinery
in case of Pakistan, but where nuclear detonation decision is concerned, I have
failed to find any reference whatsoever to support this claim that staffers and
http://www.geocities.com/ikramulhaq_l 999/l 8.html
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even Indians were players in position and had some influence on decision
making. I would, however, include ad hoc players in my application of Model Ill
which includes press and influential groups having substantial influence in
strengthening the decision that was taken. Public opinion and the opinions
collected by think tank organizations carried some weight in influencing the
governmental decision. Former chairman of the Institute of Strategic Studies in
Islamabad, said, "We have to come out and achieve a certified nuclear status.
The price is going to be very, very heavy but we have to be prepared to pay
that." 79
Domestic political pressures made it exceedingly difficult for Sharif to
exercise the non-nuclear option. Emotion-charged demonstrators took to the
streets in several cities to burn Indian flags and to demand that the government
reply to India's nuclear tests with tests of its own. Opposition political leaders
were demanding quick nuclear detonations. Among them was former Prime
Minister Benazir Bhutto, who told a television interviewer in London that without
such tests, "India will have an upper hand and will resort to aggression against
Pakistan at its own sweet will." 80 Beyond these political pressures lie cold
strategic calculations. The Prime Minister decided to consult the leaders of
national political parties on the situation arising out of the Indian nuclear tests.
The purpose of such consultations was to elicit their opinion in order to achieve a
national consensus on the policy Pakistan should adopt to deal with the
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situation. 81 Therefore, these interest groups or think tank organizations helped
raise the public sentiments toward a nuclear response from Pakistan and "reveal"
that the domestic pressure molded the government's decision to not settle for
anything else. This shows that the ad hoc players did hold a position in national
decision making and thus in some characteristic influenced governmental action.
Compromise, Coalition, Competition and Confusion

Each player brought assorted parochial baggage to the table. Individual
priorities, perceptions and problems contributed to the pulling and hauling
between various government officials from which the whole scenario of
responding to Indian nuclear tests in kind evolved. Accordingly, the decision
taken by Pakistan to detonate was not a conscious policy decision by a unitary
rational actor and as explained by Allison:
"It was an outcome resulting from compromise, coalition, competition and
confusion among government officials who see different faces of an issue."82
A review of perceptions, interests and actions will help explicate Allison's
models further. As explained earlier, the interest pursued by the military was far
different and long term than that pursued by the political organizations or even
the ad hoc players for that matter (the public and interest groups). The goals and
interests that affect players' desired outcomes include national security interests,
organizational interests, domestic interests and personal interests.
Regarding the competition between the players, it was a difficult decision
to reach as to whether the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) should
carry out the nuclear testing or the Kahuta Research Laboratories (KRL) and
81
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finally on May 18, 1998 the task was assigned to PAEC. When news reached Dr.
A.Q. Khan at KRL that PAEC will carry out the nuclear testing, he lodged a

strong protest with the Chief of Army Staff, General Jehangir Karamat. The Army
Chief, in turn, called the Prime Minister. Amongst the two, it was decided that
KRL personnel would also be involved in the nuclear test preparations and
present at the time of testing alongside those of the PAEC. 83 What determines
each player's impact on results is what Allison terms as "power". This power
stems from the position held by the player, their expertise and control over
information, power to identify options and estimate feasibilities which enables
chiefs to implement decisions. 84 This aspect can be determined by the ability and
assurances given by PAEC to the Prime Minister that the operation can be
carried out as all the technological capabilities were in order. This gave
confidence to the Chiefs (the Prime Minister and COAS) to go ahead and finalize
the decision.
Conclusion:
After analyzing the basic concepts of Model Ill and implementing it, there
still are many vacuums left which need to be filled. For these vacuums, Model Ill
fails to predict the course. As far as the players are concerned, Model Ill provides
a useful explanation about the actions emanating from the position held by the
actors. In the case of Pakistan's detonation, there was a very strong position

possessed by different players. The Foreign Minister was executing his power by
issuing strong statements that came out right after India conducted its nuclear
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tests accusing it of always having possessed a covert developing and testing of
her nuclear program. 85 This shows that the Foreign Ministry of Pakistan held a
very strong hawkish position on the Indian nuclear tests. The bureaucratic
machinery of Nawaz's government took a very firm stand in blaming the
international community for not taking the warnings by the Pakistani government
about Indian nuclear tests into serious consideration. Sharif and later the Foreign
Minister assured the public that all measures would be taken to safeguard
national security and that any response from Pakistan was backed by the
military's capability to match it. 86
The role that Pakistan's Army played in Pakistan's politics has always
remained distinguished and lndo-centric. All the defensive strategies are based
on a threat from India which out-powers Pakistan by her conventional military
strength. This was further aggravated when India tested her nuclear tests and
called Pakistan's bluff of having nuclear weapons capability. Pakistan's defense
policy is inseparable from its foreign policy to a larger extent, taking into
consideration its lndo-centric defense policy. As a commentator has aptly
remarked,
"Military needs had to command foreign policy. And because foreign and
defense policies are tor the new states a matter of survival they seriously affect
domestic policy. By this chain of logic the leader of Pakistan army is propelled
into the centre of decision-making and first its arbitrator and then its
monopolist. "87
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After the lndo-Pak tension boiled over Kashmir in 1990, Pakistan
accelerated its uranium enrichment program. The decision was taken by the
President and Chief Of the Army Staff (COAS). This is admitted by Benazir
herself during an interview to ABC television. 88 This statement indicates the
military nature of Pakistan's nuclear programme where the civilians hardly have
any say. It is not surprising that some reports point out that no prime minister has
ever been allowed to visit the nuclear facility in Kahuta. 89
Nawaz Sharif was aware of the reality after the embargo of US economic
and military aid to Pakistan. The enrichment programme was capped, but he did
not have any authority to roll back the nuclear programme to appease the
Americans. He expressed his constraint in his interview to Barbara Crossette in
June 1991, that although he wanted to take a flexible position, he could not since
he was constrained by certain factors which pointed to the hard-liners in the
military. 90 All these indicate that the civilians have hardly any role in the matter of
defense decision-making. This brief discussion on military's role in Pakistan
suggests the civil-military relationship that forms the basis of bureaucratic politics
and was at play in 1998 as well. This proves the basic and most important
postulate of Model Ill, which states action as a political resultant. According to
Allison
"Each player pulls and hauls with the power at his discretion for outcomes
that will advance his conception of national, organizational, group and personal
interests. "91
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In light of the above statement, one thing is clear; that both the military
and the civilian establishments (leaving the Prime Minister aside) were willing to
go ahead with the nuclear response to India's nuclear explosion. The
commanding structure of the military explained above clarifies the authority it
possesses where the foreign and defense policy issues are concerned. But, the
conflicting statements from the Prime Minister as discussed previously, as well
as in this chapter, remain a confusing issue.
The Prime Minister heads the civilian establishment, heads the
bureaucracy and also holds the title of Minister of Defense but still, what I fail to
understand is his role as head of the state. I believe that the Foreign Ministry and
the Military's hawkish tendencies played a game which only satisfied their own
interests and there was no conflict among the civil-military at that point in time in
1998. The lessons drawn from this aspect lead to the conclusion that both the
civilian and the military establishments possessed one voice regarding the
nuclear issue and when they pursued the same agenda there was no pulling and
hauling amongst them. Thus this environment defies the postulate that
bureaucratic politics exists. At least, in this case as I understand, the intrabureaucratic politics was almost non-existential because the three most
important bureaus, the political government, the military and the PAEC were in
complete agreement with each other to carry on the nuclear testing. As far as the
intra-bureaucratic politics is concerned, no reference is found what so ever which
would reveal that there was clash amongst individual players within the same
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organization (with only Aziz taking a different stance which being the only
example, becomes irrelevant).
Therefore, after analyzing all the postulates, I believe that this Model does
not provide enough explanation that "pulling and hauling" existed (from the
evidence gathered. Sharif's claims to the international community being helpless
by the domestic pressures and his statement to President Clinton about the
situation being out of his hands, suggest that he had a limited degree of
influence. But another way to analyze Sharif's statements could also suggest that
perhaps these conflicting statements in the beginning were made for a face
saving situation in front of the International community. He probably also could
have used the stance of "helplessness" to appease President Clinton with whom
he is on record for exchanging several intense phone conversations.
Model Ill has proved useful in identifying the Chiefs and the views they
held while being in a position of authority. It also helped to reveal certain
pressures that were inflicted on Sharif. Therefore, after a complete analysis of
Model Ill, it is safe to state that the governmental decision was a "political
resultant" and not a single intentional "choice" made by Pakistan.
I believe that there are many other factors that influence a governmental
decision making besides the bureaucracy and politics it entails. Religion, geopolitical structure, technology, international actors, capital resources, GNP of a
country and much more together determines a certain national decision making.
Unless all that is taken into account, a complete rationalization of a decision
cannot be provided. This is where Model Ill alone does not suffice the
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explanation of national decision making and is a research limitation for Model Ill.
Perhaps historians will later find some "Indians' and more information will be
disclosed. We are also limited because of free access to bureaucratic
deliberations that were undertaken at that time which, once accessed will surely
unveil certain hidden facts.
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CHAPTERV
CONCLUSION

The purpose of this thesis was to apply Graham Allison's national decision
making model to answer why Pakistan opted to go nuclear in 1998. Past
research indicates how difficult it is to apply Allison's models in their entirety. The
literature review presented in this thesis reveals more criticisms of the models
than it does the applicability. Various authors have criticized the models from the
International Relations perspective as well as from the Public Administration's
point of view. This thesis attempted to apply the models of Rational Actor,
Organizational Process and Bureaucratic Politics from an international politics
perspective.
After applying the three models, I conclude that all three of them have
some insights to offer in answering the main question of the thesis. The
usefulness of Rational Actor Model (Model I) in applying it to the Pakistani case
comes from it predicting the governmental action as a "choice" that maximized
Pakistan's strategic goals. Model I also helped in envisaging Pakistan as a
national actor which identified the problem and searched for alternatives to solve
that problem. But for Model I, a serious limitation that my research suffered from
was analyzing Pakistan's decision to detonate as a "unitary actor". There is no
way that the rationality of this decision could be explained through gauging the
unitary actor model because of the complexity of the events that led to the
decision. Also the involvement of various internal and external actors, clouds our
assumptions which are conflicting with the basic concepts of Model I.
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The Organizational Process Model (Model II) however proved quite useful
in its application in this particular case. Firstly, the organizational process model
is very technical in its applicability. Since Pakistan's going nuclear involved
technicalities which could only have been revealed through the powerful
explanation Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) provide therefore, most of
my queries were answered through a deeper analysis of Model II. During my
research I unveiled certain sequences of events which otherwise would never
have been revealed had I not used the "Organizational Process Model". A fruitful
line of research is likely to be found in Model II which could be helpful in
providing a whole different outlook to the question posed. After applying the
Organizational Process Model, I find it interesting to suggest that Pakistan's
testing of the Ghauri Missile in April 1998 was likely the result of BJP coming in
power in March 1998. BJP has always maintained a strong nuclear posture
which I believe was used by Pakistan to flex her own nuclear muscle. After
testing Ghauri in April 98, it provided Pakistan with a delivery vehicle which could
carry nuclear warhead with a range that could make India vulnerable. This
scenario did not leave Indian government comfortable and pushed them to resort
to a response which was no less than nuclear. This also helped them call
Pakistan's bluff about possessing nuclear capability which Pakistan always
maintained it had.
Applying Model II helped me divulge that probably the Standard Operating
Procedures were set into motion in the first place so to achieve the very same
response which India provided Pakistan by detonating her nuclear devices on
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May 11 & 13 in 1998. This in turn gave Pakistan an edge over India to play her
"national security" card which has been used for so many instances in the past.
Only this time it worked as a double edged sword which helped Pakistan show
the rest of the world how insecure she was with India going nuclear. Although
there is no solid reference to back up my statement here but I do strongly believe
that the sequence in which the events fell as unfolded by the application of Model
II, it bears a very good relevance to what might have initiated a decision. This
lack of reference to support my claims leads me to the limitation of my research.
The Bureaucratic Politics Model (Model 111) also provided some useful
insights into the matter of Pakistan choosing to detonate. The basic concept of
Model Ill successfully suggested that the governmental action was a political
resultant rather than a choice (refuting the claims of Model I). It also helped
clarify the players in position with their parochial priorities. But I believe that
identification of the Chiefs of various different bureaus leaves us suspended
where the pulling and hauling between the bureaus is concerned. Allison's Model
Ill is beneficial in analysis only when there is a clear bureaucratic politics involved
within the bureaus and outside the bureaus. In this case as research shows, the
bureaucratic politics was missing and thus failed to reveal how much influence it
actually had (or could have had) in shaping the decision taken by the Prime
Minister.
While conducting research on a foreign policy issue one is bound to fall
into a vacuum where an absence of data exists. This is exactly what my research
suffers from. There were many times during this research when I reached a dead
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end while trying to answer some questions regarding the defensive posture of
Pakistan or some closed door debates between the troika of the Prime Minister,
the Chief of the Army Staff and the General Head Quarters (GHQ). The official
documents were not revealed at the time Pakistan went nuclear and they are not
available to a non-military source to date. This caused some serious problems
because I am so certain that some official comments or documentaries of the
official meetings that took place between May 13 and May 28 could reveal some
undisclosed hidden agendas.
There also exist some limitations to Allison's Models as well. During my
research I found it very hard to resist taking into account roles that "external"
agents play in shaping a policy issue. These external agents in Pakistan's case
were the International actors which influenced Pakistan's decision to detonate.
They include the United States with President Clinton being on the forefront, it
includes the BJP government (and the whole geo-political environment that is
inevitable for Pakistan not to take into account while making a foreign policy
decision) and it also includes China as a country which aided Pakistan's nuclear
program. Without their clandestine help Pakistan would never have been able to
achieve the capability in the first place let alone test it. Clinton's position and
influence is very important because had the Clinton administration provided
Pakistan with more attractive economic deals than it did, perhaps the decision
would have been different. BJP government after coming into power was
responsible of coaxing the anti-Pakistani sentiments in their nation and kept a
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very strong nuclear moratorium. Pakistan's decision to detonate was definitely
suffering from all these international factors influencing in one way or the other.
All these factors helped shape Pakistan's decision. Allison's three Models
do not allocate for these International or geo-political concerns, which I believe
are so important in analyzing any national or foreign policy decision making. I
believe that all the three models tend to focus greatly on the internal actors or
players that play a role in shaping any decision.
One more limitation which I found with the applicability of Allison's Models
is that perhaps it is a model to test decisions taken by only the Western styled
democratic institutions. My reason for saying this is that in analyzing from a third
world country's perspective, I maintain that it is very important to understand the
psychology under which these nations operate in. Allison's three Models fall short
in this argument because they are very rigid in their claim. They do not have any
room for any psychological reasoning which sometimes drives nations to take up
a certain course. And nations like Pakistan bring a huge psychological baggage
with them before they make massive decisions like matching India's nuclear
capability in kind. I trust that there still is much room left for further research but
only if there is access to official documents, which might be revealed years from
now. May be then we will finally find a more complete answer regarding why
Pakistan chose to respond to Indian nuclear tests with nuclear explosions of her
own when the alternatives to that decision if approached rationally could have
provided a better future for the whole nation.
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